240 lines
12 KiB
ReStructuredText
240 lines
12 KiB
ReStructuredText
How mitmproxy works
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===================
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Mitmproxy is an enormously flexible tool. Knowing exactly how the proxying
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process works will help you deploy it creatively, and take into account its
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fundamental assumptions and how to work around them. This document explains
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mitmproxy's proxy mechanism in detail, starting with the simplest unencrypted
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explicit proxying, and working up to the most complicated interaction -
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transparent proxying of SSL-protected traffic [#ssl]_ in the presence of `Server Name Indication`_.
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Explicit HTTP
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-------------
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Configuring the client to use mitmproxy as an explicit proxy is the simplest
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and most reliable way to intercept traffic. The proxy protocol is codified in the
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`HTTP RFC`_, so the behaviour of both
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the client and the server is well defined, and usually reliable. In the
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simplest possible interaction with mitmproxy, a client connects directly to the
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proxy, and makes a request that looks like this:
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.. code-block:: http
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GET http://example.com/index.html HTTP/1.1
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This is a proxy GET request - an extended form of the vanilla HTTP GET request
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that includes a schema and host specification, and it includes all the
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information mitmproxy needs to proceed.
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.. image:: schematics/how-mitmproxy-works-explicit.png
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:align: center
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1. The client connects to the proxy and makes a request.
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2. Mitmproxy connects to the upstream server and simply forwards the request on.
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Explicit HTTPS
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--------------
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The process for an explicitly proxied HTTPS connection is quite different. The
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client connects to the proxy and makes a request that looks like this:
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.. code-block:: http
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CONNECT example.com:443 HTTP/1.1
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A conventional proxy can neither view nor manipulate an SSL-encrypted data
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stream, so a CONNECT request simply asks the proxy to open a pipe between the
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client and server. The proxy here is just a facilitator - it blindly forwards
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data in both directions without knowing anything about the contents. The
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negotiation of the SSL connection happens over this pipe, and the subsequent
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flow of requests and responses are completely opaque to the proxy.
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The MITM in mitmproxy
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^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
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This is where mitmproxy's fundamental trick comes into play. The MITM in its
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name stands for Man-In-The-Middle - a reference to the process we use to
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intercept and interfere with these theoretically opaque data streams. The basic
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idea is to pretend to be the server to the client, and pretend to be the client
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to the server, while we sit in the middle decoding traffic from both sides. The
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tricky part is that the `Certificate Authority`_ system is
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designed to prevent exactly this attack, by allowing a trusted third-party to
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cryptographically sign a server's SSL certificates to verify that they are
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legit. If this signature doesn't match or is from a non-trusted party, a secure
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client will simply drop the connection and refuse to proceed. Despite the many
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shortcomings of the CA system as it exists today, this is usually fatal to
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attempts to MITM an SSL connection for analysis. Our answer to this conundrum
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is to become a trusted Certificate Authority ourselves. Mitmproxy includes a
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full CA implementation that generates interception certificates on the fly. To
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get the client to trust these certificates, we :ref:`register mitmproxy as a trusted
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CA with the device manually <certinstall>`.
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Complication 1: What's the remote hostname?
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^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
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To proceed with this plan, we need to know the domain name to use in the
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interception certificate - the client will verify that the certificate is for
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the domain it's connecting to, and abort if this is not the case. At first
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blush, it seems that the CONNECT request above gives us all we need - in this
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example, both of these values are "example.com". But what if the client had
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initiated the connection as follows:
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.. code-block:: http
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CONNECT 10.1.1.1:443 HTTP/1.1
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Using the IP address is perfectly legitimate because it gives us enough
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information to initiate the pipe, even though it doesn't reveal the remote
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hostname.
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Mitmproxy has a cunning mechanism that smooths this over - :ref:`upstream
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certificate sniffing <upstreamcerts>`. As soon as we
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see the CONNECT request, we pause the client part of the conversation, and
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initiate a simultaneous connection to the server. We complete the SSL handshake
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with the server, and inspect the certificates it used. Now, we use the Common
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Name in the upstream SSL certificates to generate the dummy certificate for the
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client. Voila, we have the correct hostname to present to the client, even if
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it was never specified.
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Complication 2: Subject Alternative Name
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^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
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Enter the next complication. Sometimes, the certificate Common Name is not, in
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fact, the hostname that the client is connecting to. This is because of the
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optional `Subject Alternative Name`_ field in the SSL certificate
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that allows an arbitrary number of alternative domains to be specified. If the
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expected domain matches any of these, the client will proceed, even though the
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domain doesn't match the certificate Common Name. The answer here is simple:
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when we extract the CN from the upstream cert, we also extract the SANs, and
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add them to the generated dummy certificate.
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Complication 3: Server Name Indication
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^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
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One of the big limitations of vanilla SSL is that each certificate requires its
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own IP address. This means that you couldn't do virtual hosting where multiple
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domains with independent certificates share the same IP address. In a world
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with a rapidly shrinking IPv4 address pool this is a problem, and we have a
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solution in the form of the `Server Name Indication`_ extension to
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the SSL and TLS protocols. This lets the client specify the remote server name
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at the start of the SSL handshake, which then lets the server select the right
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certificate to complete the process.
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SNI breaks our upstream certificate sniffing process, because when we connect
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without using SNI, we get served a default certificate that may have nothing to
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do with the certificate expected by the client. The solution is another tricky
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complication to the client connection process. After the client connects, we
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allow the SSL handshake to continue until just _after_ the SNI value has been
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passed to us. Now we can pause the conversation, and initiate an upstream
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connection using the correct SNI value, which then serves us the correct
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upstream certificate, from which we can extract the expected CN and SANs.
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Putting it all together
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^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
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Lets put all of this together into the complete explicitly proxied HTTPS flow.
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.. image:: schematics/how-mitmproxy-works-explicit-https.png
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:align: center
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1. The client makes a connection to mitmproxy, and issues an HTTP CONNECT request.
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2. Mitmproxy responds with a ``200 Connection Established``, as if it has set up the CONNECT pipe.
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3. The client believes it's talking to the remote server, and initiates the SSL connection.
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It uses SNI to indicate the hostname it is connecting to.
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4. Mitmproxy connects to the server, and establishes an SSL connection using the SNI hostname
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indicated by the client.
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5. The server responds with the matching SSL certificate, which contains the CN and SAN values
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needed to generate the interception certificate.
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6. Mitmproxy generates the interception cert, and continues the
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client SSL handshake paused in step 3.
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7. The client sends the request over the established SSL connection.
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8. Mitmproxy passes the request on to the server over the SSL connection initiated in step 4.
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Transparent HTTP
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----------------
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When a transparent proxy is used, the HTTP/S connection is redirected into a
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proxy at the network layer, without any client configuration being required.
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This makes transparent proxying ideal for those situations where you can't
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change client behaviour - proxy-oblivious Android applications being a common
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example.
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To achieve this, we need to introduce two extra components. The first is a
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redirection mechanism that transparently reroutes a TCP connection destined for
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a server on the Internet to a listening proxy server. This usually takes the
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form of a firewall on the same host as the proxy server - `iptables`_ on Linux or
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pf_ on OSX. Once the client has initiated the connection, it makes a vanilla HTTP request,
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which might look something like this:
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.. code-block:: http
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GET /index.html HTTP/1.1
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Note that this request differs from the explicit proxy variation, in that it
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omits the scheme and hostname. How, then, do we know which upstream host to
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forward the request to? The routing mechanism that has performed the
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redirection keeps track of the original destination for us. Each routing
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mechanism has a different way of exposing this data, so this introduces the
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second component required for working transparent proxying: a host module that
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knows how to retrieve the original destination address from the router. In
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mitmproxy, this takes the form of a built-in set of
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modules_ that know how to talk to each platform's redirection mechanism.
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Once we have this information, the process is fairly straight-forward.
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.. image:: schematics/how-mitmproxy-works-transparent.png
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:align: center
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1. The client makes a connection to the server.
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2. The router redirects the connection to mitmproxy, which is typically listening on a local port
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of the same host. Mitmproxy then consults the routing mechanism to establish what the original
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destination was.
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3. Now, we simply read the client's request...
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4. ... and forward it upstream.
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Transparent HTTPS
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-----------------
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The first step is to determine whether we should treat an incoming connection
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as HTTPS. The mechanism for doing this is simple - we use the routing mechanism
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to find out what the original destination port is. By default, we treat all
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traffic destined for ports 443 and 8443 as SSL.
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From here, the process is a merger of the methods we've described for
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transparently proxying HTTP, and explicitly proxying HTTPS. We use the routing
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mechanism to establish the upstream server address, and then proceed as for
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explicit HTTPS connections to establish the CN and SANs, and cope with SNI.
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.. image:: schematics/how-mitmproxy-works-transparent-https.png
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:align: center
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1. The client makes a connection to the server.
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2. The router redirects the connection to mitmproxy, which is typically listening on a local port
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of the same host. Mitmproxy then consults the routing mechanism to establish what the original
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destination was.
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3. The client believes it's talking to the remote server, and initiates the SSL connection.
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It uses SNI to indicate the hostname it is connecting to.
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4. Mitmproxy connects to the server, and establishes an SSL connection using the SNI hostname
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indicated by the client.
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5. The server responds with the matching SSL certificate, which contains the CN and SAN values
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needed to generate the interception certificate.
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6. Mitmproxy generates the interception cert, and continues the client SSL handshake paused in
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step 3.
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7. The client sends the request over the established SSL connection.
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8. Mitmproxy passes the request on to the server over the SSL connection initiated in step 4.
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.. rubric:: Footnotes
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.. [#ssl] I use "SSL" to refer to both SSL and TLS in the generic sense, unless otherwise
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specified.
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.. _Server Name Indication: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Name_Indication
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.. _HTTP RFC: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7230
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.. _Certificate Authority: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificate_authority
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.. _Subject Alternative Name: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SubjectAltName
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.. _iptables: http://www.netfilter.org/
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.. _pf: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PF_\(firewall\)
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.. _modules: https://github.com/mitmproxy/mitmproxy/tree/master/libmproxy/platform
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