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boinc/zip/unzip/win32/nt.c

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/*
Copyright (c) 1990-2007 Info-ZIP. All rights reserved.
See the accompanying file LICENSE, version 2000-Apr-09 or later
(the contents of which are also included in unzip.h) for terms of use.
If, for some reason, all these files are missing, the Info-ZIP license
also may be found at: ftp://ftp.info-zip.org/pub/infozip/license.html
*/
/*
Copyright (c) 1996 Scott Field (dedicated to Info-Zip group)
Module Name:
nt.c
Abstract:
This module implements WinNT security descriptor operations for the
Win32 Info-ZIP project. Operation such as setting file security,
using/querying local and remote privileges, and queuing of operations
is performed here. The contents of this module are only relevant
when the code is running on Windows NT, and the target volume supports
persistent Acl storage.
User privileges that allow accessing certain privileged aspects of the
security descriptor (such as the Sacl) are only used if the user specified
to do so.
Author:
Scott Field (sfield@microsoft.com)
Last revised: 18 Jan 97
*/
#define WIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN
#define UNZIP_INTERNAL
#include "../unzip.h"
#include <windows.h>
#ifdef __RSXNT__
# include "../win32/rsxntwin.h"
#endif
#include "../win32/nt.h"
#ifdef NTSD_EAS /* This file is only needed for NTSD handling */
/* Borland C++ does not define FILE_SHARE_DELETE. Others also? */
#ifndef FILE_SHARE_DELETE
# define FILE_SHARE_DELETE 0x00000004
#endif
/* This macro definition is missing in old versions of MS' winbase.h. */
#ifndef InterlockedExchangePointer
# define InterlockedExchangePointer(Target, Value) \
(PVOID)InterlockedExchange((PLONG)(Target), (LONG)(Value))
#endif
/* private prototypes */
static BOOL Initialize(VOID);
static VOID GetRemotePrivilegesSet(CHAR *FileName, PDWORD dwRemotePrivileges);
static VOID InitLocalPrivileges(VOID);
volatile BOOL bInitialized = FALSE; /* module level stuff initialized? */
HANDLE hInitMutex = NULL; /* prevent multiple initialization */
BOOL g_bRestorePrivilege = FALSE; /* for local set file security override */
BOOL g_bSaclPrivilege = FALSE; /* for local set sacl operations, only when
restore privilege not present */
/* our single cached volume capabilities structure that describes the last
volume root we encountered. A single entry like this works well in the
zip/unzip scenario for a number of reasons:
1. typically one extraction path during unzip.
2. typically process one volume at a time during zip, and then move
on to the next.
3. no cleanup code required and no memory leaks.
4. simple code.
This approach should be reworked to a linked list approach if we expect to
be called by many threads which are processing a variety of input/output
volumes, since lock contention and stale data may become a bottleneck. */
VOLUMECAPS g_VolumeCaps;
CRITICAL_SECTION VolumeCapsLock;
static BOOL Initialize(VOID)
{
HANDLE hMutex;
HANDLE hOldMutex;
if (bInitialized) return TRUE;
hMutex = CreateMutex(NULL, TRUE, NULL);
if(hMutex == NULL) return FALSE;
hOldMutex = (HANDLE)InterlockedExchangePointer((void *)&hInitMutex,
hMutex);
if (hOldMutex != NULL) {
/* somebody setup the mutex already */
InterlockedExchangePointer((void *)&hInitMutex,
hOldMutex);
CloseHandle(hMutex); /* close new, un-needed mutex */
/* wait for initialization to complete and return status */
WaitForSingleObject(hOldMutex, INFINITE);
ReleaseMutex(hOldMutex);
return bInitialized;
}
if (!bInitialized) {
/* initialize module level resources */
InitializeCriticalSection( &VolumeCapsLock );
memset(&g_VolumeCaps, 0, sizeof(VOLUMECAPS));
InitLocalPrivileges();
bInitialized = TRUE;
}
InterlockedExchangePointer((void *)&hInitMutex,
NULL);
ReleaseMutex(hMutex); /* release correct mutex */
CloseHandle(hMutex); /* free the no longer needed handle resource */
return TRUE;
}
BOOL ValidateSecurity(uch *securitydata)
{
PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR sd = (PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR)securitydata;
PACL pAcl;
PSID pSid;
BOOL bAclPresent;
BOOL bDefaulted;
if(!IsWinNT()) return TRUE; /* don't do anything if not on WinNT */
if(!IsValidSecurityDescriptor(sd)) return FALSE;
/* verify Dacl integrity */
if(!GetSecurityDescriptorDacl(sd, &bAclPresent, &pAcl, &bDefaulted))
return FALSE;
if(bAclPresent && pAcl!=NULL) {
if(!IsValidAcl(pAcl)) return FALSE;
}
/* verify Sacl integrity */
if(!GetSecurityDescriptorSacl(sd, &bAclPresent, &pAcl, &bDefaulted))
return FALSE;
if(bAclPresent && pAcl!=NULL) {
if(!IsValidAcl(pAcl)) return FALSE;
}
/* verify owner integrity */
if(!GetSecurityDescriptorOwner(sd, &pSid, &bDefaulted))
return FALSE;
if(pSid != NULL) {
if(!IsValidSid(pSid)) return FALSE;
}
/* verify group integrity */
if(!GetSecurityDescriptorGroup(sd, &pSid, &bDefaulted))
return FALSE;
if(pSid != NULL) {
if(!IsValidSid(pSid)) return FALSE;
}
return TRUE;
}
static VOID GetRemotePrivilegesSet(char *FileName, PDWORD dwRemotePrivileges)
{
HANDLE hFile;
*dwRemotePrivileges = 0;
/* see if we have the SeRestorePrivilege */
hFile = CreateFileA(
FileName,
ACCESS_SYSTEM_SECURITY | WRITE_DAC | WRITE_OWNER | READ_CONTROL,
FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_DELETE, /* no sd updating allowed here */
NULL,
OPEN_EXISTING,
FILE_FLAG_BACKUP_SEMANTICS,
NULL
);
if(hFile != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
/* no remote way to determine SeRestorePrivilege -- just try a
read/write to simulate it */
SECURITY_INFORMATION si = DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION |
SACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION | OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION |
GROUP_SECURITY_INFORMATION;
PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR sd;
DWORD cbBuf = 0;
GetKernelObjectSecurity(hFile, si, NULL, cbBuf, &cbBuf);
if(ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_BUFFER == GetLastError()) {
if((sd = HeapAlloc(GetProcessHeap(), 0, cbBuf)) != NULL) {
if(GetKernelObjectSecurity(hFile, si, sd, cbBuf, &cbBuf)) {
if(SetKernelObjectSecurity(hFile, si, sd))
*dwRemotePrivileges |= OVERRIDE_RESTORE;
}
HeapFree(GetProcessHeap(), 0, sd);
}
}
CloseHandle(hFile);
} else {
/* see if we have the SeSecurityPrivilege */
/* note we don't need this if we have SeRestorePrivilege */
hFile = CreateFileA(
FileName,
ACCESS_SYSTEM_SECURITY,
FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE | FILE_SHARE_DELETE, /* max */
NULL,
OPEN_EXISTING,
0,
NULL
);
if(hFile != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
CloseHandle(hFile);
*dwRemotePrivileges |= OVERRIDE_SACL;
}
}
}
BOOL GetVolumeCaps(
char *rootpath, /* filepath, or NULL */
char *name, /* filename associated with rootpath */
PVOLUMECAPS VolumeCaps /* result structure describing capabilities */
)
{
char TempRootPath[MAX_PATH + 1];
DWORD cchTempRootPath = 0;
BOOL bSuccess = TRUE; /* assume success until told otherwise */
if(!bInitialized) if(!Initialize()) return FALSE;
/* process the input path to produce a consistent path suitable for
compare operations and also suitable for certain picky Win32 API
that don't like forward slashes */
if(rootpath != NULL && rootpath[0] != '\0') {
DWORD i;
cchTempRootPath = lstrlenA(rootpath);
if(cchTempRootPath > MAX_PATH) return FALSE;
/* copy input, converting forward slashes to back slashes as we go */
for(i = 0 ; i <= cchTempRootPath ; i++) {
if(rootpath[i] == '/') TempRootPath[i] = '\\';
else TempRootPath[i] = rootpath[i];
}
/* check for UNC and Null terminate or append trailing \ as
appropriate */
/* possible valid UNCs we are passed follow:
\\machine\foo\bar (path is \\machine\foo\)
\\machine\foo (path is \\machine\foo\)
\\machine\foo\
\\.\c$\ (FIXFIX: Win32API doesn't like this - GetComputerName())
LATERLATER: handling mounted DFS drives in the future will require
slightly different logic which isn't available today.
This is required because directories can point at
different servers which have differing capabilities.
*/
if(TempRootPath[0] == '\\' && TempRootPath[1] == '\\') {
DWORD slash = 0;
for(i = 2 ; i < cchTempRootPath ; i++) {
if(TempRootPath[i] == '\\') {
slash++;
if(slash == 2) {
i++;
TempRootPath[i] = '\0';
cchTempRootPath = i;
break;
}
}
}
/* if there was only one slash found, just tack another onto the
end */
if(slash == 1 && TempRootPath[cchTempRootPath] != '\\') {
TempRootPath[cchTempRootPath] = TempRootPath[0]; /* '\\' */
TempRootPath[cchTempRootPath+1] = '\0';
cchTempRootPath++;
}
} else {
if(TempRootPath[1] == ':') {
/* drive letter specified, truncate to root */
TempRootPath[2] = '\\';
TempRootPath[3] = '\0';
cchTempRootPath = 3;
} else {
/* must be file on current drive */
TempRootPath[0] = '\0';
cchTempRootPath = 0;
}
}
} /* if path != NULL */
/* grab lock protecting cached entry */
EnterCriticalSection( &VolumeCapsLock );
if(!g_VolumeCaps.bValid ||
lstrcmpiA(g_VolumeCaps.RootPath, TempRootPath) != 0)
{
/* no match found, build up new entry */
DWORD dwFileSystemFlags;
DWORD dwRemotePrivileges = 0;
BOOL bRemote = FALSE;
/* release lock during expensive operations */
LeaveCriticalSection( &VolumeCapsLock );
bSuccess = GetVolumeInformationA(
(TempRootPath[0] == '\0') ? NULL : TempRootPath,
NULL, 0,
NULL, NULL,
&dwFileSystemFlags,
NULL, 0);
/* only if target volume supports Acls, and we were told to use
privileges do we need to go out and test for the remote case */
if(bSuccess && (dwFileSystemFlags & FS_PERSISTENT_ACLS) &&
VolumeCaps->bUsePrivileges)
{
if(GetDriveTypeA( (TempRootPath[0] == '\0') ? NULL : TempRootPath )
== DRIVE_REMOTE)
{
bRemote = TRUE;
/* make a determination about our remote capabilities */
GetRemotePrivilegesSet(name, &dwRemotePrivileges);
}
}
/* always take the lock again, since we release it below */
EnterCriticalSection( &VolumeCapsLock );
/* replace the existing data if successful */
if(bSuccess) {
lstrcpynA(g_VolumeCaps.RootPath, TempRootPath, cchTempRootPath+1);
g_VolumeCaps.dwFileSystemFlags = dwFileSystemFlags;
g_VolumeCaps.bRemote = bRemote;
g_VolumeCaps.dwRemotePrivileges = dwRemotePrivileges;
g_VolumeCaps.bValid = TRUE;
}
}
if(bSuccess) {
/* copy input elements */
g_VolumeCaps.bUsePrivileges = VolumeCaps->bUsePrivileges;
g_VolumeCaps.dwFileAttributes = VolumeCaps->dwFileAttributes;
/* give caller results */
memcpy(VolumeCaps, &g_VolumeCaps, sizeof(VOLUMECAPS));
} else {
g_VolumeCaps.bValid = FALSE;
}
LeaveCriticalSection( &VolumeCapsLock ); /* release lock */
return bSuccess;
}
BOOL SecuritySet(char *resource, PVOLUMECAPS VolumeCaps, uch *securitydata)
{
HANDLE hFile;
DWORD dwDesiredAccess = 0;
DWORD dwFlags = 0;
PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR sd = (PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR)securitydata;
SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_CONTROL sdc;
SECURITY_INFORMATION RequestedInfo = 0;
DWORD dwRev;
BOOL bRestorePrivilege = FALSE;
BOOL bSaclPrivilege = FALSE;
BOOL bSuccess;
if(!bInitialized) if(!Initialize()) return FALSE;
/* defer directory processing */
if(VolumeCaps->dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY) {
/* opening a directory requires FILE_FLAG_BACKUP_SEMANTICS */
dwFlags |= FILE_FLAG_BACKUP_SEMANTICS;
}
/* evaluate the input security descriptor and act accordingly */
if(!IsValidSecurityDescriptor(sd))
return FALSE;
if(!GetSecurityDescriptorControl(sd, &sdc, &dwRev))
return FALSE;
/* setup privilege usage based on if told we can use privileges, and if so,
what privileges we have */
if(VolumeCaps->bUsePrivileges) {
if(VolumeCaps->bRemote) {
/* use remotely determined privileges */
if(VolumeCaps->dwRemotePrivileges & OVERRIDE_RESTORE)
bRestorePrivilege = TRUE;
if(VolumeCaps->dwRemotePrivileges & OVERRIDE_SACL)
bSaclPrivilege = TRUE;
} else {
/* use local privileges */
bRestorePrivilege = g_bRestorePrivilege;
bSaclPrivilege = g_bSaclPrivilege;
}
}
/* if a Dacl is present write Dacl out */
/* if we have SeRestorePrivilege, write owner and group info out */
if(sdc & SE_DACL_PRESENT) {
dwDesiredAccess |= WRITE_DAC;
RequestedInfo |= DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION;
if(bRestorePrivilege) {
dwDesiredAccess |= WRITE_OWNER;
RequestedInfo |= (OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION |
GROUP_SECURITY_INFORMATION);
}
}
/* if a Sacl is present and we have either SeRestorePrivilege or
SeSystemSecurityPrivilege try to write Sacl out */
if((sdc & SE_SACL_PRESENT) && (bRestorePrivilege || bSaclPrivilege)) {
dwDesiredAccess |= ACCESS_SYSTEM_SECURITY;
RequestedInfo |= SACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION;
}
if(RequestedInfo == 0) /* nothing to do */
return FALSE;
if(bRestorePrivilege)
dwFlags |= FILE_FLAG_BACKUP_SEMANTICS;
hFile = CreateFileA(
resource,
dwDesiredAccess,
FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE | FILE_SHARE_DELETE,/* max sharing */
NULL,
OPEN_EXISTING,
dwFlags,
NULL
);
if(hFile == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
return FALSE;
bSuccess = SetKernelObjectSecurity(hFile, RequestedInfo, sd);
CloseHandle(hFile);
return bSuccess;
}
static VOID InitLocalPrivileges(VOID)
{
HANDLE hToken;
TOKEN_PRIVILEGES tp;
/* try to enable some interesting privileges that give us the ability
to get some security information that we normally cannot.
note that enabling privileges is only relevant on the local machine;
when accessing files that are on a remote machine, any privileges
that are present on the remote machine get enabled by default. */
if(!OpenProcessToken(GetCurrentProcess(),
TOKEN_QUERY | TOKEN_ADJUST_PRIVILEGES, &hToken))
return;
tp.PrivilegeCount = 1;
tp.Privileges[0].Attributes = SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED;
if(LookupPrivilegeValue(NULL, SE_RESTORE_NAME, &tp.Privileges[0].Luid)) {
/* try to enable SeRestorePrivilege; if this succeeds, we can write
all aspects of the security descriptor */
if(AdjustTokenPrivileges(hToken, FALSE, &tp, 0, NULL, NULL) &&
GetLastError() == ERROR_SUCCESS) g_bRestorePrivilege = TRUE;
}
/* try to enable SeSystemSecurityPrivilege, if SeRestorePrivilege not
present; if this succeeds, we can write the Sacl */
if(!g_bRestorePrivilege &&
LookupPrivilegeValue(NULL, SE_SECURITY_NAME, &tp.Privileges[0].Luid)) {
if(AdjustTokenPrivileges(hToken, FALSE, &tp, 0, NULL, NULL) &&
GetLastError() == ERROR_SUCCESS) g_bSaclPrivilege = TRUE;
}
CloseHandle(hToken);
}
#endif /* NTSD_EAS */
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