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<title>Security</title>
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2002-08-20 23:54:17 +00:00
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<body bgcolor=ffffff>
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<h2>Security</h2>
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<p>
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Many types of attacks are possible in public-participation
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distributed computing.
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<ul>
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<li> <b>Result falsification</b>.
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Attackers return incorrect results.
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<li> <b>Credit falsification</b>.
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Attackers return results claiming more CPU time than was actually used.
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<li>
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<b>Malicious executable distribution</b>.
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Attackers break into a BOINC server and,
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by modifying the database and files, attempt to
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distribute their own executable (e.g. a virus program) disguised as a
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BOINC application.
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<li>
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<b>Overrun of data server</b>.
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Attackers repeatedly send large files to BOINC data servers,
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filling up their disks and rendering them unusable.
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<li>
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<b>Theft of participant account information by server attack</b>.
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Attackers break into a BOINC server and steal email
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addresses and other account information.
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<li>
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<b>Theft of participant account information by network attack</b>.
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Attackers exploit the BOINC network protocols to steal account information.
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<li>
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<b>Theft of project files</b>.
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Attackers steal input and/or output files.
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<li>
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<b>Intentional abuse of participant hosts by projects</b>.
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A project intentionally releases an application that abuses participant
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hosts, e.g. by stealing sensitive information stored in files.
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<li>
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<b>Accidental abuse of participant hosts by projects</b>.
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A project releases an application that unintentionally abuses particpant
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hosts, e.g. deleting files or causing crashes.
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</ul>
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BOINC provides mechanisms to reduce the likelihood of some of these attacks.
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<p>
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<b>Result falsification</b>
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<p>
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This can be probabilistically detected using redundant computing and
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result verification: if a majority of results agree (according to an
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application-specific comparison) then they are classified as correct.
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<p>
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<b>Credit falsification</b>
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<p>
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This can be probabilistically detected using redundant computing and
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credit verification: each participant is given the minimum credit from
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among the correct results.
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<p>
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<b>Malicious executable distribution</b>
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<p>
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BOINC uses code signing to prevent this. Each project has a key pair
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for code signing.
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The private key should be kept on a network-isolated
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machine used for generating digital signatures for executables.
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The public key is distributed to, and stored on, clients.
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All files
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associated with application versions are sent with digital signatures
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using this key pair.
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<p>
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Even if attackers break into a project's BOINC servers, they will
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not be able to cause clients to accept a false code file.
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<p>
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BOINC provides a mechanism by which projects can periodically change
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their code-signing key pair.
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The project generates a new key pair, then
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(using the code-signing machine) generates a signature for the new
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public key, signed with the old private key.
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The core client will accept
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a new key only if it's signed with the old key.
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This mechanism is
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designed to prevent attackers from breaking into a BOINC server and
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distributing a false key pair.
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<p>
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<b>Overrun of data server</b>
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<p>
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Each result file has an associated maximum size.
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Each project has a
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<b>upload authentication key pair</b>.
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The public key is stored on the
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project's data servers. Result file descriptions are sent to clients
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with a digital signature, which is forwarded to the data server when the
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file is uploaded. The data server verifies the file description, and
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ensures that the amount of data uploaded does not exceed the maximum size.
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<p>
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<b>Theft of participant account information by server attack</b>
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<p>
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Each project must address this using conventional security practices.
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All server machines should be protected by a firewall, and
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should have all unused network services disabled.
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Access to these machines should be done only with encrypted protocols like SSH.
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The machines should be subjected to regular security audits.
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<p>
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Projects should be undertaken only the organizations that have
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sufficient expertise and resources to secure their servers.
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A successful
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attack could discredit all BOINC-based projects, and
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public-participation computing in general.
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<p>
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<b>Theft of participant account information by network attack</b>
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<p>
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<b>Theft of project files</b>
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<p>
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The input and output files used by BOINC applications are not encrypted.
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Applications can do this themselves, but it has little effect
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since data resides in cleartext in memory, where it is easy to access
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with a debugger.
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<p>
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<b>Intentional abuse of participant hosts by projects</b>
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</p>
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<p>
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BOINC does nothing to prevent this (e.g. there is no "sandboxing" of
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applications).
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Participants must understand that when they join a BOINC project,
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they are entrusting the security of their systems to that project.
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<p>
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<b>Accidental abuse of participant hosts by projects</b>
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<p>
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BOINC does nothing to prevent this.
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The chances of it happening can
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be minimized by pre-released application testing.
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Projects should test
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their applications thoroughly on all platforms and with all input data
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scenarios before promoting them to production status.
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